

A SYSTEM FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION?

A MONOGRAPH

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AY 96-97

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Report Documentation Page		Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
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1. REPORT DATE 22 MAY 1997	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE System for humanitarian intervention?		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
		5b. GRANT NUMBER
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) Volker Halbauer		5d. PROJECT NUMBER
		5e. TASK NUMBER
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) US Army Command and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies, 250 Gibbon Ave, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 66027		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER ATZL-SWV
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The original document contains color images.		
14. ABSTRACT This monograph investigates the reasons for the lack of coordination and combined effort between political leadership, military engagement and humanitarian activity during a humanitarian intervention. It analyses basic principles to successfully combine these aspects in a system for these type of operations. The peace operation in Somalia between 1992 and 1995 is used as an example and analytical framework. The monograph first describes the changed nature of conflicts with the end of the Cold War and defines intra state conflicts, which result in failed states, as happened in Somalia, as the most likely type of conflict for the foreseeable future. After a brief description of the nature of humanitarian intervention as a new type of peace operation in a post-Cold War environment and the anatomy of a failed state the focus is on analyzing the political-, military-, and humanitarian key actor's criteria for action and success in humanitarian interventions. The monograph discusses the reasons for failure in humanitarian interventions like Somalia as a combination of the key actor's still Cold War dominated event-or situation oriented view instead of a process-oriented view necessary to create a "New World Order" and not adjusted criteria for action and success in a new crises environment. The basis for the lack of political, military and humanitarian cooperation is the missing combined systematic approach for conflict resolution. The study concludes in defining three basic principles -the acceptance of humanitarian intervention as a process, the necessary shift from a force-oriented to a time-oriented approach, and the application of a dynamic combined strategy -for a system to successfully combine the political, military and humanitarian dimensions of a humanitarian intervention.		
15. SUBJECT TERMS		

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT 1	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 64	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			


SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Lieutenant Colonel Volker Halbauer


Title of Monograph: *A System for Humanitarian Intervention?*

Approved by:




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Accepted this 22d Day of May 1997

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2 April 1997

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Abstract

A SYSTEM FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION? by LTC (GS) Volker Halbauer, USA, 59 pages.

This monograph investigates the reasons for the lack of coordination and combined effort between political leadership, military engagement and humanitarian activity during a humanitarian intervention. It analyses basic principles to successfully combine these aspects in a system for these type of operations. The peace operation in Somalia between 1992 and 1995 is used as an example and analytical framework.

The monograph first describes the changed nature of conflicts with the end of the Cold War and defines intra state conflicts, which result in failed states, as happened in Somalia, as the most likely type of conflict for the foreseeable future. After a brief description of the nature of humanitarian intervention as a new type of peace operation in a post-Cold War environment and the anatomy of a failed state the focus is on analyzing the political-, military-, and humanitarian key actor's criteria for action and success in humanitarian interventions.

The monograph discusses the reasons for failure in humanitarian interventions like Somalia as a combination of the key actor's still Cold War dominated event- or situation-oriented view instead of a process-oriented view necessary to create a „New World Order“ and not adjusted criteria for action and success in a new crises environment. The basis for the lack of political, military and humanitarian cooperation is the missing combined systematic approach for conflict resolution. The study concludes in defining three basic principles - the acceptance of humanitarian intervention as a process, the necessary shift from a force-oriented to a time-oriented approach, and the application of a dynamic combined strategy - for a system to successfully combine the political, military and humanitarian dimensions of a humanitarian intervention.

I. Introduction

Michael J. Hogan, Professor of History at The Ohio State University, describes in *The End of the Cold War* the period after the destruction of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 as „the beginning of the end of the Cold War“.¹ He points out that after the events of 1989 the focus of public attention has shifted from an ideological and geopolitical struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States, between Russia and the West, to the creation of a „New World“ built on the ashes of the old order.²

A significant phenomenon of this creation of the „New World“ with its “New Order“ or „Disorder“ is the collapse of states, as happened in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. These types of intra state conflicts have a significant effect for regional stability and security and are not a short term phenomenon, but the most likely type of conflict for the foreseeable future.³

The types of peace operations to solve such problems have also changed significantly. During the Cold War era the role of military force in peace operations was to “keep the peace”. Military forces were employed only after the conflict parties had agreed to outside intervention. Thus, one major factor for success was not to use military force until a settlement had been reached.⁴ The conflict between Syria and Israel in 1967 and the following establishment of a United Nations (UN) buffer zone on the Golan Heights in 1974 or the employment of a UN force (UNFICYP) in Cyprus in 1964 to help to cool down the nationalist conflict between Turkey and Greece are typical examples⁵.

The major peace operations since 1989 are now marked by military interventions into active civil wars. Military forces enter an environment where no government has

invited them, where the people suffer to a high degree because of the conflict, where the fighting factions are unwilling to cooperate and where political or economic pressure have brought no solution. Operations in Somalia between 1992 and 1995 and Bosnia since 1991 are examples.⁶

The common description for these new types of peace operations is humanitarian intervention. They gain their legitimacy in the world community by humanitarian reasons. The various key actors are the United Nations or a UN sanctioned coalition of nations with the United States (U.S.) as the most powerful element, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs), a military intervention force and of course the fighting factions within the collapsed or failed state itself.

The UN Operations UNITAF and UNOSOM II between 1992 and 1995 in Somalia are an important precedent for this type of international intervention. They mark the first step actions of the nations of the world from the Cold War struggle towards the formation of the „New Order“. On the one side it shows the willingness of the world community to promote peace and well-being. On the other side the Somalia case makes it very clear that humanitarian interventions are much more complex than the peace operations during the Cold War.

Finally, the UN, the U.S. and most of the participating nations during the Somalia peace operation saw the undertaking as a failure with decisive consequences for the catastrophes that followed Somalia's collapse. The United States refusal to respond to the genocide in Rwanda that began in April 1994 was due in part to its retreat from Somalia, announced after the deaths of eighteen US Army Rangers on October 3-4, 1993. The fear

of „crossing the Mogadishu line“, the loss of neutrality in the face of provocation, as expressed by General Michael Rose, former commander of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) describes the restraint of becoming an unwilling participant in a civil war. ⁷

One major reason for such a development is that the actors within the political, military and humanitarian dimension of a peace operation have their own internal views, values, doctrine and strategy of how to react in these types of crisis. They have their own perception about the means necessary to solve it and the endstate expected to be created. These circumstances, in context with the actors' basic principles, very often prevent a close coordination and cooperation to create an environment where a collapsed state can begin with reconciliation and reconstruction.

Figure 1 in Appendix A shows the principle combination of political, humanitarian and military effort to support in a failed state environment. It symbolizes balanced collective measures to optimize the cutting-section of the three circles - the output for the people in a failed state. In addition the picture shows the various capabilities of the political, humanitarian and military actors. Some of these capabilities are unique others might overlap - but generally spoken all of them are essential for the reconciliation and reconstruction of a failed state like Somalia.

The events in Somalia following August 1993 described as the „hunt for Aideed“ changed this picture dramatically as shown in Figure 2, Appendix A. The military side became overwhelming strong and influential with the result of an almost to zero decreasing outcome for the Somali people.

One important reason for such an effect is the combination of a still Cold War dominated event- or situation-oriented view instead of a process-oriented view necessary to create the „New Order“ with not adjusted criteria for action in a new crises environment.

The question therefore is: what are the reasons for the lack of coordination and combined effort between political leadership, military engagement and humanitarian activity and what can be done to successfully combine these aspects in a system for humanitarian intervention.

This monograph seeks to answer this question by focusing on the reasons for such a view based on the actor's criteria for action and success. After a brief description of the nature of humanitarian intervention as a peace operation in a post Cold War environment and the anatomy of a failed state the monograph focuses on analyzing the actor's criteria for action and success as a basis for their view of the situation. The peace operation in Somalia as the only completed operation of this type in a failed state is used as example and analytical framework.

II. Post Cold War Environment, Somalia's Collapse and Humanitarian Intervention

The collapse of the Soviet communism has left us with a paradox:
there is less threat, but also less peace.

Manfred Wörner, NATO Secretary General

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 the world has changed significantly. This paragraph first examines the nature and origins of this new environment. Thereafter it

demonstrates why a state collapse as happened in Somalia has its fundamental roots in the Cold War period and why humanitarian intervention is a different peace operation from those conducted before 1989.

II.1. Conflict in the Post Cold War Environment

With the end of the Cold War the types of probable conflicts for the foreseeable future have changed. They have changed from a more or less stable scenario created by the relative stability between the United States and the Soviet Union to relative uncertainty especially for the Third World countries. This change in the nature of conflict must result in consequences to a change in reaction to conflict from event-oriented static action to process-orientation with dynamic principles.

The Cold War was the most dangerous rivalry between Great Powers in modern history even if it evolved into a Long Peace. The Cold War was a division of the world into two hostile camps, an ideological contest between capitalism and communism, between democracy and authoritarianism. It was a competition for the allegiance of, and for influence over the Third World, a struggle of massive intelligence organizations behind the scenes and an arms race to the extreme.⁸

Nevertheless, the Cold War did not lead to an open clash between the super powers on the battlefield. In the presence of a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons the super powers' interests were balance of power and stability. From this perspective the Cold War was a single event for the so called first and second world. This event was portrayed

by the confrontation between NATO and Warsaw Pact and an event that concentrated the thinking in the East and the West on a fundamental purpose: the prevention of a Third World War. The decay of the Soviet Union has completely changed this situation. The world situation has changed concerning the interaction between East and West and more importantly respecting the structure of future conflict.

Today the international system faces basically three types of probable conflicts for the future. The first one, a great power conflict over the global balance of power, is the least likely one given the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons, the shrinking ideological struggle between communism and capitalism, and the decreasing importance of territorially defined resources. Conflicts about the regional balance of power, the second type, like the Persian Gulf War, are more probable and could have wide and lasting regional or global implications. The United States, as the only remaining superpower, will play a major role in constraining such military clashes. The third type of conflict, communal conflicts, scattered around the globe and often taking place within states, are the most likely form of future conflict. Most of the approximately thirty significant conflicts since the end of the Cold War have been internal.⁹

The end of the Cold War has reduced the risk of conflict between the major powers on the one side and on the other side it also removed some of the restraints that inhibited conflict. New conflicts break out because the fear of super power intervention has diminished. The face of conflict within Africa for example has changed from proxy wars fueled by the United States and the Soviet Union to internal power struggles of local war lords.¹⁰ This is not unique to the modern era, of course. What has changed is the

complex interplay of transnational, national, and subnational identities with rapid and far-reaching social, technological, and economic changes. The clashes are over identity among individuals, groups, and nations. They can happen at three levels - over transnational identities, like international Islamism; national identities, as in Russia; and sub-national identities based on religious, ethnic, or linguistic divisions, as in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia or nowadays in Rwanda.¹¹

Somalia therefore is only one example for these new post Cold War types of conflict, but its case shows the shift from ideological dominated conflicts to a far more complex environment. An environment which challenges today's thinking of actors like the UN, the NGO community, or military representatives who are involved in conflict management. The Somalia case shows the need to change focus for interveners from an event-oriented Cold War view to a view which reflects on the roots of the new type of post Cold War conflicts.

II.2. The Somali State Collapse and the End of the Cold War

Somalia was and is one of the artificial states within Africa, without a strong social base of support, resources, or popular legitimacy. It survived during the Cold War thanks to superpower patronage and international norms that favored stability and sovereignty. As happened to several other such states, Somalia collapsed with the end of the Cold War, as external support was withdrawn and social demands for economic advancement and better governance increased.¹² To understand the Somali state collapse in 1992 with its

inherent enormous complexity one must look at the process responsible for this evolution, its underlying society, economy and culture.

The Somali state, an artificial entity defined by colonial powers, hovered above a predominantly pastoral, subsistence, and decentralized society. Its culture always had a complex and powerful system of ethical norms and rules to regulate behavior, closely linked with the requirements of a pastoral, subsistence way of life. This pastoral system with its culture of kinship and Islam that supported it began to suffer as commodity production for international markets was introduced. Colonialism disconnected Somali traditions with its underlying social and cultural forces. The process of decolonization then created an independent state that remained aloof from society. After the coup in 1969 that brought Siad Barre to power, and particularly after the 1977-78 war with Ethiopia, Somalia suffered under a harsh authoritarian regime that encouraged animosity among clan groups and used massive military force to put down popular protest. When Somalia's president Siad Barre was finally forced out of office in 1991, the Somali people faced the perils of living in the violent wreckage of a collapsed state. The tragic images broadcast around the world by Western media in mid-1992 captured the horrible degenerative stages of a long process of political, social, and economic disintegration in Somalia.¹³

Somalia was not just starving because of an act of nature. The famine that gripped Somalia in 1992 resulted from the degeneration of the country's political system and economy. With the final collapse there was little but the wreckage of distorted traditions and artificial institutions, a vacuum that the most ruthless elements in the society soon filled. The food imported for relief efforts became a prized plunder of merchants,

unemployed workers, and gangs of young men. Militia leaders used stolen food aid for purchasing weapons and keeping followers loyal. Essentially, the country's entire political and economic system revolved around plundered food.¹⁴

In this kind of situation state collapse occurs. Structure, authority, legitimate power, law, and political order fall apart, leaving behind a civil society that lacks the ability to rebound to fill the vacuum. Therefore, the structures of legitimate order must be reconstituted in some form, old or new. The breakdown of social coherence on an extensive level as civil society can no longer create, aggregate, and articulate the supports and demands that are the foundation of the state is inherently linked to the demise of the state. With the collapse of the state, social and political structures break down too. Accordingly, state collapse is not a short-term phenomenon but a cumulative, incremental process.¹⁵

Figure 3, Appendix A, expounds the existence of the same process-oriented problem as it appears from an outside as well as an inside perspective. The outside perspective as described above for the case of Somalia has a political, humanitarian and military dimension with complex interrelations. For the people within a collapsed state the perspective is different but the results are the same. Political, economic and social decay produces a power vacuum which attracts war lords to fill it. Civil war destroys political, economic and social structures and produces famine and suffering. It does not matter where one starts this circle, the process of destruction is the same.

The determinant factors of this process, portrayed from inside or from outside, can not be isolated. A collapsed state has a political, humanitarian and military dimension.¹⁶

Nations do not descended into anarchy overnight, so interventors should expect neither the reconciliation of combatants nor the reconstruction of civil societies and national economies to be swift.¹⁷

II.3. Fundamentals of Humanitarian Intervention

A state collapse occurs over time. It is a process. The act of intervention must be seen as part of inverting this process. Intervention for humanitarian purposes might stop starvation as happened in Somalia in late 1992 and early 1993, but a single event-oriented reaction of the world community under the pressure of images broadcast around the world does not address the roots of the problem. Given the pressure created by the horror of what is transmitted by the media: starving babies in Somalia or detention camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the world community and especially governments come under the force of a to „do something syndrome.“ People expect something to happen, something to be done quickly.¹⁸

Under such circumstances a collapsed state poses a difficult challenge for the international community. It forces some kind of reaction in a type of conflict environment for which the world community with a still Cold War mind set is least prepared to carry out. It enforces a kind of peace operation different from the days of the Cold War. Humanitarian Intervention is the new term for that. A new term for a new type of peace operations. An operation that needs to focus on the process not an event or a specific situation.

During the Cold war, peacekeeping had a well defined meaning and place in the global security structure. Peacekeeping was something primarily done by the United Nations and only with the consent of the United States and the Soviet Union. It was also only done with the consent of all the major belligerent parties involved. Peacekeeping only occurred when a cease-fire was in place and a peace agreement made or in the making. The peacekeeping forces used armed force only in self-defense. The United Nations, as well as the rest of the world, used the term „peacekeeping“ for over 40 years to describe a specific type of operations without having an official definition of what constituted a peacekeeping operation.¹⁹

Today's situations like the Gulf War, Somalia, and Bosnia show that the traditional conditions for peacekeeping do not always apply. In his July 1992 „*An Agenda for Peace*“ the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Gali describes the changing context of the world: „The concept of peace is easy to grasp; that of international security is more complex,...“²⁰ With the end of the Cold War he sees the security arm of the UN as a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace.²¹

This view of a wider mission for the World Organization is closely connected with the question of sovereignty. In his „*An Agenda for Peace*“ Boutros Boutros-Gali writes that „the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty ... has passed; its theory was never matched by reality.“²²

This change in thinking is the basis for situations in which the world community can make an intervention legitimate. Intervention in this sense is the deliberate

involvement in the affairs of another state or transnational organization in order to change its behavior or character, using techniques that run the gamut from targeted information activities to economic sanctions to military force. In this sense intervention is a fact of life and it means that neoisolationist policy is neither realistic nor desirable. In a world of eroding state sovereignty, intervention is neither intrinsically good nor intrinsically bad, but must be judged on the basis of its purpose, costs, and prospects in each case²³ and humanitarian intervention is not just humanitarian in nature but has a political, economic, social and military dimension too.²⁴

Traditional peacekeeping operations, authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter were undertaken with consent of the parties and may encounter situations in which the use of force became necessary for self defense. Action authorized by the UN in Somalia for UNITAF and UNOSOM II was undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to enforce a UN Security Council mandate which may, or may not have the consent of the parties, and which may require the use of force.²⁵

For the near future intervention for humanitarian reasons will be the world community's means to solve interstate and intrastate conflicts, generated by ethnic, religious, and political differences. Therefore the question of when and how to intervene must be weighed against the issue of relevant interest of the key actors. In a broader context the legitimacy of intervention will be challenged by the sanctity of national sovereignty or nonintervention in the internal affairs of another state.²⁶ From this perspective humanitarian intervention is a peace enforcement operation, very different from the traditional peacekeeping operations conducted by the UN since the 1940's.

Figure 4, Appendix A, is of course a generalization and simplification of the problem of humanitarian Intervention, but based on the conclusions and assumptions of this chapter it demonstrates that four major key actors with various internal differentials are involved: political leadership, military and humanitarian support and the people, fighting factions etc. in the failed state itself. The process is defined by at least three dimensions as shown in Figure 4: time, action and the actors.

The post Cold War environment, the basics and framework of a collapsed state like Somalia and the change in types of peace operations shows that humanitarian Intervention has several dimensions with an outside and inside perspective. It is a process which needs the effort of all available political, humanitarian and military strength combined and focused on the collapsed state's special circumstances and exigencies.

The next chapter examines how the major actors' situational perspective during the operations in Somalia in 1992 and 1993 with respect to their criteria for action and success prevented combined action to create optimum results.

III. The Dimensions of Humanitarian Intervention

III.1. The Political Dimension

We will not retreat into a Cold War foxhole.
Madeleine Albright, September 1993

The political dimension of humanitarian intervention in today's global situation is clearly dominated by the UN and the United States. The UN is the ultimate source of

legitimacy for the world community's decision to restrict the sovereignty of a state.²⁷ The U.S., with the end of the Cold War, is the most powerful nation within the UN organization. The right to veto UN Security Council's decisions, economic and military power make actions of the world community without at least U.S. support or tolerance impossible. On the other side the U.S., as a nation based on freedom, democracy and human rights, can only act without the risk of losing its reputation if its actions are tolerated by the UN.²⁸ This interrelation encourages focus on the two major actors in the political dimension of humanitarian intervention - the UN and the U.S. - when examining the reasons for political shortfalls during the Somalia Operation.

Madeleine Albright's statement, „We will not retreat into a Cold War fox hole“, illustrates the political will to react and to adapt to the post Cold War environment, but the necessary steps are not done yet. This chapter investigates the U.S. and UN strategic thinking for humanitarian intervention and then examines why their criteria for action or success based on this thinking made success in Somalia so difficult.

The August 1991 *National Security Strategy of the United States*²⁹ describes the important changes after the Cold War era and focuses on the relation between future global developments and U.S. strategic goals. A specific type of coordinated international response to regional catastrophes with the need for humanitarian intervention is yet not mentioned in the 1991 document. Nevertheless new and different types of conflict are recognized: „...we confront dangers more ambiguous than those we previously faced.“³⁰ Politically the focus is still oriented towards the Cold War adversaries and the principle of stability: „We need to consider how the United States and its allies can best respond to a

new agenda of political challenges - such as the troubled evolution of the Soviet Union or the volatile Middle East.³¹ The military remains the major factor to deal with this new environment: „What type and distribution of forces are needed to combat not a particular, poised enemy, but the nascent threats of power vacuums and regional instability?“³²

With respect to regional trends in the „New World“, with its opportunities and concerns, the document describes: „The end of the Cold War should benefit Africa in that it will no longer be seen as a battleground for superpower conflict“ and „Africa is now entering an age in which it can benefit from past mistakes and build a realistic, self-sustaining future. It is our interest, for political as well as humanitarian reasons, to help that process.“³³

The changes after the Cold War era, the change from a static, bipolar world, concentrated to preserve a status quo to a world where intra state conflict dominates conflict patterns are recognized without doubt. Even a process-oriented view is mentioned, but the focus is still towards a static balance of power with the military as the main source to reach this goal:

„As the war in the Gulf made clear, the easing of the Soviet threat does not mean an end to all hazards. As we seek to build a new world order in the aftermath of the Cold War, we will likely discover that the enemy we face is less an expansionist communism than it is instability itself. And, in the face of multiple and varied threats to stability, we will increasingly find our military strength a source of reassurance and a foundation for security, regionally and globally.“³⁴ The use of military means in the strategic equation³⁵ is still key „to respond effectively to crises“.³⁶

This force-oriented strategic thinking of the U.S. is an important source for differences between the UN and the U.S., and it is key for the UN-U.S. differences during the Somalia operations in 1992. In contrast to the force orientation of the U.S., the UN

follows a time-oriented approach. The most important source on UN-thought in this area is Boutros Boutros Gali's 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*. This document separates peace operations into four categories: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.³⁷

An Agenda for Peace describes the aim of the UN in terms of identifying the earliest possible stage of situations that could produce conflict, and to remove the sources of danger through diplomacy before violence results. When conflict erupts, the purpose is to engage in peacemaking aimed to resolve the issues that have led to conflict and then to preserve peace through peace-keeping by assisting in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Finally, to stand ready to assist in peace-building in differing contexts.³⁸ The document's purpose statements further illuminate each of the above categories in addition to their specific definitions. In this context preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out, peacemaking seeks to halt conflicts that have already broken out, peacekeeping seeks to preserve peace once it is attained, and peacebuilding's goal is to prevent the reoccurrence of violence.³⁹

This vision regards the nature of a collapsed state as mentioned above in a primarily time-oriented approach. Definitions and purpose statements indicate a time relation to conflict within the UN thinking in accordance to peace support operations. This thinking serves as the UN criteria for action and organizes the UN officials' interaction with other groups or nations, especially those nations which are necessary to actually put UN plans and policy into action.

Conflict with the world organization's view of the strategic equation occurs when participating states in a peace operation organize their own thinking in peace support operations in a different way. The U.S. criteria for action or nonaction are much different as indicated in the discussion of U.S. National Security Strategy above. This difference in view between the UN and the U.S., a force-oriented approach versus a time-oriented one, is the major obstacle for common effort in response to crises. A force-oriented view tries to quickly fix a problem, to find an immediate solution for an acute crises. Time-orientation is concentrated towards the roots of a crises not just actual symptoms.

The 1991 U.S. thinking on the basis of the *National Security Strategy* as described above was force-oriented when dealing with future conflicts. This basic interpretation on how to act in a peace operation has not changed during the following years. The U.S. view of the Somalia operation as a UN debacle is primarily based on a different approach towards how to conduct peace operations. The debate within the U.S. security community, after Somalia, on the categorization of peace operations further specifies the criteria for involvement in peace operations. To evaluate actual events in Somalia between 1992 and 1994 the thinking about peace operations within the most powerful nation of the UN must be examined first. The following definitions reflect the general consensus of the national security community of the United States.

Peacekeeping missions are non-combat military operations (exclusive self-defense) conducted by UN authorized forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties designed to monitor and facilitate an existing truce agreement. Aggravated peacekeeping is military combat operation conducted by UN authorized forces and designed to monitor

and facilitate an existing truce agreement; initially begun as non-combat operations and with the consent of all major belligerents, but which subsequently, due to any number of reason, become combat operations where UN forces are authorized to use force (combat power) not only for self-defense but also for defense of their assigned missions. At last, peace enforcement is a military combat operation conducted by UN authorized forces in which combat power or the threat of combat power is used to compel compliance with UN sanctions or resolutions.⁴⁰

This continued force-oriented view of peace operations logically leads to the criteria for action or nonaction from a U.S. point of view as described in the 1994 *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* and in the *Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations* from May 1994.

The 1994 *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*⁴¹ describes the „basic principles that will guide our (the U.S.) decision on when to use force“. Four criteria are mentioned: „First and foremost, our national interests will dictate the pace and extent of our engagement“. This criterion asks for specific areas where vital or survival interests are involved. In this case the use of force will be decisive and, if necessary, unilateral. „Second, as much as possible, we will seek the help of our allies or relevant multilateral institutions“. In this case a proportional commitment of the allies or multilateral institutions is necessary. „Third, in every case, we will consider several critical questions before committing military force“. This questions are:

„Have we considered nonmilitary means that offer a reasonable chance of success? What types of U.S. military capabilities should be brought to bear, and is the use of military force carefully matched to our political objectives? Do we have reasonable

insurance of support from the American people and their elected representatives? Do we have timelines and milestones that will reveal the extend of success or failure, and , in either case, do we have an exit strategy?“.

„Fourth, our engagement must meet reasonable cost and feasibility thresholds“.

The belief for lasting improvement can promote action based on this criterion.

The *Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, signed on May 3, 1994 goes one step further. This directive provides a policy framework for U.S. support and involvement in UN and other multinational peace operations. There are four key criteria for consideration: First, the objective for an operation must be clearly defined, in the U.S. national interests, and assured of continuing public and congressional support. Second, the commitment of U.S. troops should not be open-ended. Third, an exit strategy must be in place. Fourth, operations involving U.S. forces must involve command and control arrangements acceptable to the U.S.⁴²

As a result for U.S. involvement in peace operations the primary question is whether there is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, defined as international aggression, a humanitarian disaster within a violent conflict, the interruption of an established democratic system, or gross violation of human rights within a violent conflict. This is the standard force-oriented question for involvement or noninvolvement in a humanitarian operation. Consequently, additional considerations must be whether the presence of U.S. troops is essential to an operation's success, the degree of risk to U.S. forces and whether the will exists to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives.⁴³

The development of thinking between 1992 and 1994 reached a high degree of clarification for the question of involvement or non-involvement in peace operations, but was from the U.S. point of view still force-oriented. Such an assessment represents not just the U.S. view, of course. As Lieutenant-Colonel P.A. Cunningham, Director Army Lessons Learned Center Canada, points out: „A UN mandate is based on a United Nations decision, which is always a compromise“; the world community must have a clear objective, a strategy, and a defined endstate for action in a peace operation, forces must be able to protect themselves, and the allegation of military forces under a permanent UN command is not a realistic goal for the moment. Nevertheless the world must find a system for humanitarian intervention. The information revolution in conjunction with the media's „whistle blowing“ will leave no choice.⁴⁴

The following paragraphs focus on the relation between a time-oriented UN-view and a force-oriented U.S.-view in accordance to actual events during the Somalia peace operations. Critical, very closely connected issues during this operation, were political vision, the acceptance of warlords, disarmament, mission change, nation building, neutrality and time limits for the operation. In this areas the political key actor's visions in conjunction with their criteria for involvement and action did not match with the reality within a failed state and therefore provided the ground for an unsuccessful end.

As explained above, the situation in a collapsed state and the circumstances that lead to this situation must be seen as a process. Political, humanitarian and military forces are involved in such a process that finally leads to the collapse of a state. The views from

inside and outside have the same dimensions and humanitarian intervention is much more complex than peacekeeping operations before 1989.

Therefore there is no such thing as a single humanitarian surgical strike to solve the problems within a failed state. As soon as a humanitarian intervention into Somalia was decided by the UN Security Council it must have been clear that it will thrust deep into Somali politics. It should have been clear also that a large military force alone can not be the only means to support internationally agreed-upon political goals. A collapsed state can not be fixed in a few weeks and with one element out of the political-military-humanitarian triad alone. There must be the political will to see a solution through first.⁴⁵

The initial political vision for humanitarian intervention in Somalia, written in the mandate for UNITAF, condemned the operation to certain failure. The idea that a substantial military force could occupy a collapsed state without affecting the local political situation was false. An intervention for humanitarian reasons leads to two quintessential political tasks: guaranteeing the borders of the failed state against outside threat attracted by a power vacuum in country, and more important, in the Somalia case, constructing the basis for an apparatus of government where it is absent. The mandate for UNITAF did not include such longer-term tasks. Therefore the political leadership disassociated itself from difficult political decisions, leaving them for the future.⁴⁶

Although time is the critical factor at the beginning of a humanitarian intervention it is not necessary to define an endstate or an exit strategy at the very beginning. The end state in a process dominated situation, like a collapsed state, should be part of a political strategy

created over time and developed during the process to promote reconciliation and institutional rehabilitation.

Of course, in the face of dying people, with pictures of starving Somali children broadcast around the world, pressure upon responsible politicians became enormous. Time pressure then leads to quick political decisions using available strategies for action to implement them. This is exactly what happened in the Somalia case. The UN already in country with UNOSOM I in late 1992 had a time-oriented perspective. The only nation capable to lead an immediate reaction, created by the final collapse in the same time period, was the United States, with an underlying force-oriented strategy. An adaptation of the two different strategies did not occur. Therefore, the transition from the US lead force-oriented UNITAF to a UN lead time-oriented follow on UNOSOM II force in May 1993 then left an explosive situation.

UNITAF, based on a different concept, put force protection issues ahead of longer-term political considerations by maintaining close relations with most Somali warlords, especially Mohammed Farah Aideed.⁴⁷ In doing so clan leaders, including Mohammed Farah Aideed, did not feel that opposition would be futile in the face of an overwhelming force implemented by world community mandate.⁴⁸ Under such circumstances the warlords in Mogadishu could successfully wrestle for political credibility from UNOSOM and UNITAF since during the UNITAF period the goal was to avoid confrontation with the heavily armed contenders in Somalia. This was a fundamental misreading of the local situation. What most Somali people wanted was the freedom to

meet and discuss issues outside the range of the weapons in the hands of the warlord's enforcers.⁴⁹

American leadership refused to face up to the long-term political and social consequences of an intervention. The Bush and Clinton administrations did not realize that any intervention would deeply involve the United States in Somali politics. American leaders tried to get in and out of Somalia as quickly as possible and thereby postponed the problems that logically followed from the intervention.⁵⁰ The rationale for action was event-oriented, primarily on the military part of the operation, and not on the process behind it. The issues of disarmament and mission change are critical in this context.

The roughly 30,000 troops who arrived in late 1992 had more power than anyone after and therefore the greatest capability to disarm the belligerent forces. However, U.S. officials allowed the Somali warlords to keep their weapons if they moved the arms out of Mogadishu or into their respective cantonments.⁵¹ The large and powerful UNITAF had the resources, but insisted that its mandate was limited and nonpolitical.⁵²

Failure to disarm the warlords was a tragic mistake. Appendix B provides an overview about the problem of fighting factions and disarmament in Somalia. A decision to disarm right from the beginning might have been an early guaranty for success in a short period of time with a reduction in both effort and hardship for the forces and people involved.⁵³ A concentrated effort to remove and destroy the Somali's heavy arms was possible and would have sent an early and strong message that the United States and the United Nations were serious about restoring order. A lot of Somalis fully expected to be disarmed and were surprised at the inaction of the intervention force. As a result the

warlords, always acutely sensitive to the correlation of forces quickly realized that their power would not be challenged. They had the chance to wait until the strong initial U.S. lead force had left and then challenge the much weaker follow on UN force for which the necessary ground was not led.⁵⁴

The issue of disarmament shows clearly the tension between event-oriented, short-term tactics to limit the mission in terms of time, expense, and risk of casualties and the broader strategy to facilitate political reconciliation.⁵⁵ When, in August 1993, with the drawdown of U.S. forces, the need for disarmament became obvious, it was too late for a successful operation of this type. The final decision to disarm and the available forces did not match and the result was the fatal Ranger clash in October 1993. Congressional pressure then forced the Clinton administration to instruct U.S. forces to adopt a purely defensive posture, to end the hunt for Aideed, and prepare for withdrawal in March 1994. From this time on the ultimate goal of humanitarian intervention - nation-building - was not possible.⁵⁶

One of the most common arguments for the failure of the Somalia intervention is that the nature of the mission changed. This argument basically stresses the initial success of UNITAF to feed the Somalis, but the operation began to founder when UNOSOM II took over in May 1993 and expanded the mission to include the rebuilding of basic state institutions - nation building. This logically leads to the strict division between humanitarian intervention and nation-building, largely because of the belief that the UN tried to take on more than it could control.⁵⁷

A complex undertaking like a humanitarian intervention can not be planned in advance in a manner which clearly defines each stage of the operation in time and space. The most needed elements are time, means and flexibility. In essence, there must be sufficient forces and resources to manage a difficult and time consuming evolutionary process with various stages and the need for probably different and expanding UN mandates.⁵⁸ Humanitarian intervention is not just stopping of starvation. It is a much more complex process and it needs a very broad, long-term view. To stop the dying is just the necessary first step in this process.

The ultimate goal of the intervention in Somalia should have been to create a safe political space in which the society has the opportunity to implement traditional Somali problem-solving procedures. An intervening force needed to be able to develop a comprehensive plan, one that interprets humanitarian, political, and military activities based on the norms of the local culture. Such a plan could have provided the necessary coherence between the various elements of a humanitarian intervention.⁵⁹ With the first step, the initial military action, of the operation the immediate problem of dying could have been brought under control. This part, however, could do little to compensate for the deep social and political division in a failed state.⁶⁰

Every distinction between humanitarian intervention and nation-building is problematic. When U.S. troops intervened in December 1992 to stop starvation and the theft of food, they disrupted the political economy and stepped deep into the muck of Somali politics. While reestablishing some order, the U.S. operation inevitably affected the

direction of Somali politics and became nation-building because the most basic component of nation-building is an end to anarchy.⁶¹

The initial plans for Operation Restore Hope included the employment of up to ten reserve military civil-affairs units to work on the re-establishment of local government, particularly to rebuilding the police and judiciary. Finally the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed the idea because the operation was supposed to last only six weeks. The U.S. devoted money and attention to the process of rebuilding government structures only after the Rangers battle, but by then it was too late. The missing element therefore was a connection between relief and development. Given the fact that large parts of the economy revolved around the plunder of food aid, the failure to develop a plan to restore the economy to normal was a grievous error and emblematic of the mission's failure to address anything beyond exigencies.⁶²

The arguments for strict neutrality of a peace force and time limits for its employment are another two sources for confusion. „Neutrality“ and „impartiality“ are often used as synonymous words, but they are not. There is an important distinction between „being neutral“ and „acting impartially“. The responsibility of the local officials and their staffs was to ensure that the UN mandate was applied in an impartial manner, and that the rules of engagement are employed in an impartial manner. The word neutral applies in neither case. It is essential that the local government and opposing forces perceive the action of interveners as impartial, but neutrality is something else. One can not be neutral about civil rights abuses by any group. The world community can not be neutral in the face of repression, oppression, or acts of violence. Least of all can one be

neutral about forces or individuals that actively oppose the implementation of the international mandates of the United Nations.⁶³ In this sense rules of engagement and UN mandates have a different quality, which can actually support the recovery of a failed state during an evolutionary process.

Process-oriented thinking also shows the limitations and counterproductive results created by the establishment of time limits for a peace operation. In Somalia, as described above, the warlords were interested in seeing the departure of UN forces. People may rightfully derive satisfaction from the initial short-term humanitarian successes, but it is clear that the cause of humanitarian intervention was not advanced in Somalia under such circumstances.⁶⁴

Somalia was not primarily a humanitarian problem. It was and is a complex political one with various dimensions. This will be the case for most possible humanitarian interventions in the future. The political dimension of such operations, with the UN providing the legitimacy of the world community and the U.S. as the most powerful and capable nation in this community, must prepare the ground for success. Neither a strictly force-oriented or strictly time-oriented view is the proper way to engage in a humanitarian intervention. A systematic combination of both provides the chance for success. The political leadership must not rely on short-term interests in creating criteria which lead to failure. The criteria must be adapted to the respective situation. Without a vision based on such criteria the efforts of the other two elements of a humanitarian intervention, the military force and the NGO community, can not succeed.

III.2. The Military Dimension

The standard for Americas' Army must be „decisive victory“.

General Gordon Sullivan

U.S. Army Chief of Staff, 1992

The military dimension of peace operations has various facet. The wide scale of these operations includes operations run by a directly UN controlled force, in the sense of traditional peace keeping like UNOSOM I, UN sanctioned ad hoc coalitions led by a powerful nation like the U.S. during UNITAF, or actions of a regional based organization with a UN mandate like NATO's operations in Bosnia.

This chapter first describes the influence of the political dimension of peace operations on military planing, doctrine and actual actions on the ground during the transformation from political vision to military action, followed by a discussion of the three key military criteria for success or failure in a failed state environment like Somalia. As in the discussion of the political dimension the main focus will be on the two key actors, the UN and the U.S. during the Somalia operations between 1992 and 1995.

In *On War* Carl von Clausewitz provides insight: „ war is an extension of policy by other means.“ The previous chapter demonstrated that politics forms the framework for peace operations. Assumed all political means have been used prior to a humanitarian intervention, then war as well as peace operations, and humanitarian intervention as a particular peace operation, are extensions of policy by other means.⁶⁵ The close interrelation between the National Security Strategy of a nation like the U.S or the principles for the use of military force within an organization like the UN and military

operations dominates the reliance of the military on political odds for action. Therefore, the criteria for political action or nonaction, mentioned in the previous chapter, are the basis for the use of military power to reach political goals.

The UN, as the world community's organization provides legitimacy for the use of military force, but has no „UN-forces“ under direct control. The availability of military force depends on the willingness of the UN's members to actively participate in a peace operation. The member states, especially the five permanent members of the security council, control when and how to use military force. When military force is used, it finds its legacy still in Cold War thinking, in the use of military force in terms of either doing nothing, or employing overwhelming forces in a decisive manner.⁶⁶

The 1992 *National Military Strategy of the United States* recognizes the change with the end of the Cold War:

„While the end of the Cold War has signaled a dramatic improvement in the prospects for peace, security, and economic progress, we still live in a very troubled world with danger, uncertainty, and instability in many regions.“ And further: „It is certain that US military forces will be called up again“ and „Into the foreseeable future, the United States and its allies, often in concert with the United Nations, will be called up to mediate economic and social strife and to deter regional aggressors.“⁶⁷

The world has changed, but Cold War force-oriented thinking is still present in statements like:

„Once the decision for military action has been made, ...one of the essential elements of our national military strategy is the ability to rapidly assemble the forces needed to win - the concept of applying decisive force to overwhelm our adversaries and thereby terminate conflicts swiftly with a minimum loss of life.“⁶⁸

The dominating criteria for preparation and deployment of military force is the use of overwhelming combat power in a decisive manner to gain victory. While doctrine, the

basis for use and training of military forces, is directly influenced by military strategy actual operations and tactics used in the post-Cold War environment Somalia were still dominated by Cold War principles and criteria.

The following section focuses on three key areas for military success or failure with respect to humanitarian intervention and describes why the missing transition from a Cold War to a post-Cold War environment made military actions in Somalia so difficult: the relationship between war, victory and humanitarian intervention; the relation between mission, plan and end state; and the transition process between the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations.

Field Manual 100-5, Operations, the U.S. Army's principal military manual, before 1993 argues for the requirement to achieve decisive victory and the quick resolution of conflict. Although this manual has also included considerations of Low Intensity Conflict through the section entitled Operations Other than War, decisive Victory and quick conflict resolution are still the focal points.⁶⁹ The two gunship attacks launched by the U.S. in June and July 1993 in hope of neutralizing the presence of the Somali warlord, General Aideed, are an example for the use of Cold War doctrine in a post-Cold War environment. The point is not to deny the threat posed by General Aideed, but to question the methods used. The net effect was not to remove Aideed, but rather to employ available means of force on the basis of not adjusted doctrine which has attracted an adverse response and critically has not brought a resolution to the conflict any nearer. Indeed it may be have prolonged it. The doctrine used had not yet recognized the needs of

a change for an environment of internal conflict and had the danger associated with the counter-productive use of force.⁷⁰

The purpose of military forces in a humanitarian intervention is to stop the fighting and to assist in bringing about a fair and lasting resolution to conflict, not to achieve military victory.⁷¹ Figure 5, Appendix A, shows the effect of the use of overwhelming combat force in a decisive manner. The military becomes the absolutely dominating part and the political and humanitarian elements are not even visible anymore. In contrast, the whole approach must be towards the use of force as a means to an end, not an end itself. The forces must be prepared for combat, but the focus should remain on non-military means to reach a final agreement. In such a way military forces would not become part of the problem, rather than part of the solution to it.⁷²

The relationship between endstate, campaign plan and mission is important for military success. If „means“ do not meet „ends“, if the forces provided for a mission are inadequate to meet an ambitious UN mandate, like the UN's decision for disarmament in Somalia after the Ranger Clash in October 1993, the military will find itself in a strategic dilemma.⁷³ The size, composition, and operational mission of a committed force must be determined by the purpose and the tasks to be performed. If the role of the force changes, then the composition of the force must be reevaluated to ensure that the forces are adequate for the new task. When the military force is employed without carefully matching ends and means, then mission creep is the result.⁷⁴ In this sense mission creep is the intersection of imprecise political guidance with the military's traditional „can do“ attitude.⁷⁵

While matching ends, ways and means for strategic purposes timing becomes the critical factor. Too often Governments wait until they are confronted with a crisis, and then problem solving becomes largely a matter of choosing an unattractive option. The world community's final decision to intervene militarily in Somalia in late 1992, the decision to shift from a peace-keeping mission, UNOSOM I, to humanitarian intervention, UNITAF, was such an option. Early military intervention goes against conventional thinking that force should be used only as a last resort. As a result, the international community's military resources are to a significant degree focused not on the prevention of deadly conflict, but on the final phases of conflict.⁷⁶ Early military intervention with a force capable to respond to an over time changing environment in a failed state becomes a critical military criteria for success.

The complexity of peace operations, and humanitarian intervention in particular, has its major roots in the difficulty of transforming political vision into military strategy, operations and finally tactics on the ground in a very deverse environment of a failed state. What makes this process important is the fact that the decisions on the tactical level, the decision of a soldier on patrol for example, might have significant and direct impact on politics. Soldiers need specific additional training to make the step from a warrior to a humanitarian.

In Humanitarian or Warriors?: Race, Gender, and Combat Status in Operation Restore Hope, Laura L. Miller, postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University, and Charles Moskos, Professor of sociology at Northwestern University, reported findings based on data collected from army participants in Operation Restore Hope about the subject. They

are an example for the difficult and time consuming process of transforming political vision into tactical tasks and they show that a Cold War oriented force can not change over night.

According to the survey thirty percent of the soldiers followed a warrior strategy during the operation. This strategy constructed negative stereotypes of Somalis and perceived them as the enemy. These soldiers characterized the locals as lazy and uncivilized people who preferred a lifestyle of gunfire, drugs, and the resulting poverty. Such generalization eased the tension of not knowing who was the enemy. The perception that providing aid only contributed to the Somali's laziness was apparent in comments such as, „They are all just sitting around waiting for a handout“. These soldiers did not believe that clan rivalry was a legitimate reason for the Somalis to inflict violence and starvation on one another. They felt the conditions in Somalia were the fault of the people themselves, because they chose not to work, to use the drug khat, and to fight among themselves, for no apparently good reason. Those who adopted the warrior role believed that U.S. troops would become the laughingstock of the UN „forces“ if they did not return violence with violence. Because soldiers were subject to physical assault and sniper fire and were constrained by the rules of engagement, some „warrior“ reasoned that they should protect themselves against the enemy through physical brutality. Those on patrol and guard duty in Mogadishu typically understood Somali culture to respect „force“ and „force“ only. If they were allowed to beat attacking or intruding Somalis, they argued they would eliminate the image of the United States as accepting abuse, and, through intimidation, would reduce the amount of aggressive behavior directed at them. Much of

the justification of the warrior strategy relied on a comparison of the U.S. troops with other UN contingents. They believed that Americans differed from other national contingents in their treatment of Somali thieves and attackers. Americans observed that other UN forces, who either beat offending Somalis (Belgians and Italians were used as examples) or fired into unruly crowds (They referred here to Nigerians and Tunisians), were less likely to be subject to future attacks. They felt that the U.S. forces looked ridiculous and helpless because they seemingly allowed themselves to be stoned. One soldier suggested: „We should beat them and scare them some, or shoot one and make an example.“⁷⁷

The military dimension of humanitarian intervention is totally dependent on political vision and odds. Military strategy and doctrine changes when politics varies its requirements for the use of military power. As long as the political dimension uses Cold War strategy the military dimension will employ forces on the basis of Cold War doctrine. Under such circumstances humanitarian intervention becomes a difficult task for the military. It has to operate under conditions, where the shifting meaning of victory is not yet realized to its full extent and where the transition from fighting a war to operate in a new type of peace operation is not yet complete. The full strength of military efforts can only be achieved if the transformation process from the political to the military level is functioning and if humanitarian efforts are well integrated in this process.

III.3. The Humanitarian Dimension

As an international aid agency we arrive in a country and community largely unknown. By doing this we have assumed the right of intervention on behalf of others.

Mark Bradbury, ACTIONAID, February 1994

The chaos around the world after World War II, especially in many countries in the developing world, has produced a sometimes incompatible assortment of organizations to respond to crises. Together these organizations form a humanitarian response system, made up by nongovernmental or private-voluntary organizations, like The Safe the Children Fund (SCF) or Oxfam Famine Relief (OXFAM), international organizations, like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and UN agencies, like World Food Program (WFP), United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF), and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).⁷⁸

In late summer 1992, UN agencies and NGOs along with the ICRC, collectively called Humanitarian Relief Organization (HROs), worked together within Somalia. Each organization went to Somalia with its own particular purpose, mandate and expectations. However, it is not possible in this monograph to discuss the various organizational patterns and behaviors of these organizations in detail.⁷⁹ This monograph will look at HROs as a theoretical single body and focus on the situation of HROs at the end of the Cold War, some of their common and basic criteria for action and success, in order to

define essential areas for cooperation with the political and military dimension of a humanitarian intervention.

The changing world order deeply affects the HRO's community as a OXFAM relief worker pointed out in 1993: „As the world cracks apart, so the UN and non governmental agencies ... are expected to pick up the pieces and even try to put them together again... We are dealing with the central issue of our time.“⁸⁰ It is within the current reality of change, after the end of the Cold War, that humanitarian aid and assistance organizations as well as politicians and the military must operate. The objective of the HRO's is to assist civilian populations that have been affected by the scourge of war. However, in order to do so on all fronts, these organizations must work within increasingly difficult-to-define operations that are steadily becoming the status quo of modern peace operations.⁸¹

In Somalia, as early as August 1989, ActionAid, for example, had suspended all operational programs, reduced its staff from 62 to 14 and had lost \$ 300,000 worth of assets. As the conflict spread through the country NGOs withdrew to Mogadishu and by December 1990 many international NGOs drastically scaled back their programs. In October 1992 the inter clan war was replaced by armed looting of food aid, thus exacerbating the deadly famine that at its height was killing 1,000 people per day in the south. The cost of armed protection for relief supplies became the equivalent to the cost of the food delivery.⁸² Ongoing warfare, and especially the failure of the Somali warlords to allow for the secure delivery of humanitarian assistance then led to the world community's intervention in December 1992.⁸³

HRO's, of course, work with or without political or military support. Some, like the ICRC, even choose not to work with the military at all.⁸⁴ The situation in Somalia, in December 1992, however, shows that cooperation within the political-, military- and humanitarian dimension of a peace operation is necessary to stop the suffering of people. The following paragraphs investigate what the HRO's common and basic criteria for action are. They can be defined in the areas of moral commitment, neutrality and impartiality, methods for operations, cost efficiency and security.

Most of the workers, national or international, during a HRO's operation do their work on a voluntary basis. A moral commitment therefore is the first step for these workers to get involved in a humanitarian disaster in order to help people. The development of a personal relationship to the situation they face is the basis for their commitment. Professional soldiers on the contrary do not need this type of moral commitment, they are involved because they received an order to do so, whatever moral commitment might be the basis of this order. As a result of their moral commitment, HRO's believe to have the basically stronger basis for helping in a humanitarian disaster.⁸⁵

Neutrality and impartiality is another very important criteria for HRO's actions. Humanitarian assistance is bounded by international humanitarian law as described in the Geneva Convention and their Additional Protocols. The aims of humanitarian assistance, according to ICRC principles for example, include respect for human life and the promotion of health and dignity for all. It means caring for all victims, and for them alone, and refusing to accept suffering as legitimate in any circumstances. Neutrality in this sense is defined as not taking sides in hostilities or engaging at any time in controversies of a

political, racial, religious or ideological nature. Impartiality means not making any discrimination as to nationality, race, religion, beliefs, class or political opinion.⁸⁶

Humanitarian organizations face the same dilemma according to neutrality and impartiality as discussed above for the political and military dimension. In a post-Cold War conflict like Somalia, within a new type of peace operation like UNITAF and UNOSOM II, the demand to be neutral and impartial must be considered.

The third criteria has its fundamentals in the special methods used by HRO's. They all act on the principle not to create dependencies and regard the reality of humanitarian intervention, that developing dependencies is probable worse than the original problem. HRO's search for sustainable development. They have an aversion to the quick resolution which they believe military operations tend to emphasize. They know real development is a slow and difficult process. Involvement of the local population and making people help themselves are their goals.⁸⁷ With this principles HRO's have a primarily process-oriented strategy that fits into the situation in a country like Somalia in 1992. Figure 6, in Appendix A illustrates this process orientation. An exemption is ICRC. ICRC does no development work and is not focused on the root causes of an emergency, but concentrates on fixing immediate needs of people in conflict or disasters. Therefore the ICRC is clearly event-oriented.⁸⁸

The cost of an operation, or better its cost efficiency, is another important factor. HROs are voluntary organizations and depend to a high degree on money they get from fundraising. Public recognition in order to get donors is an important criteria of success for HROs. They need to tell their story because they are in competition with other NGO's

and the military too.⁸⁹ In 1992, for example, in response to the media coverage in Somalia, ActionAid launched an appeal for funds for Africa with pictures of suffering children in Mogadishu, where the organization was not even working.⁹⁰

Fundraising itself is one part of the problem, cost-efficient use of the available means is another. HROs try to use local equipment, local workers and local materials as much as possible. While they use small staffs, money its still a major problem. The humanitarians of Belet Uen, a town in Somalia at the border to Ethiopia, were the single largest economic activity and source of money for the region. A remarkable fact is that it cost the four international HROs of Belet Uen a mere (Cdn) \$ 250,000 per month in rental, basic housekeeping and personal transportation fees; a quarter of a million dollars before even beginning to conduct their business. The situation gets worse when it becomes necessary to hire local guards for protection, to secure compounds, food magazines and aid transportation. In September 1992, the ICRC suffered a major set back when its warehouse east of the Shabeelle river in Belt Uen, containing 1,000 metric tons of food, was almost completely looted. In Belet Uen the HROs had to pay an average of \$ 140 a month for one guard to hire after the incident.⁹¹

Security is another major issue, closely connected to the other factors. HROs need a secure environment for their work. They rely on security on two aspects of their culture, not on guards, which they employ only if absolutely necessary, or on weapons, which they virtually never carry themselves. One is the importance of their work for the community, the way the local population perceives their work, the other is neutrality.⁹² In a clan based society like Somalia, with a hierarchical structure of elders, security is highly dependent on

the ability to show people, and especially the elders, that an organization is worth taking responsibility for and that the organization is an asset worth investing in. In this sense accepted humanitarian aid becomes a kind of life insurance for HROs. If an organization gets attacked a typical reaction is to withdraw the organization's international staff or to stop humanitarian aid for a period of time. From this perspective humanitarian aid is not only used as a kind of life insurance but as kind of weapon for self-defense too.⁹³

If this form of providing security does not work anymore, as was the case in mid 1992, when most of the HROs had to stop their work in Somalia, when they became part of the war economy by being systematically looted, when there is a need to hire security guards to a high extent, then this implies that there is no stability and long term development is no longer possible. By hiring security an HRO protected themselves against the very people they were there to work for and if long term development is no longer possible or financially too risky it was more cost effective to put the money elsewhere. The final solution is to withdraw.⁹⁴

The HROs find themselves in a dilemma at the end of the Cold War. The dilemma is the old development oriented, mostly reactive humanitarian aid versus humanitarian support in post-Cold War patterns of conflict. The traditional response by humanitarian aid agencies has normally been short term emergency relief until such time as the conflict is over and one can begin rehabilitation, recovery and development programs. ICRC with a mandate to protect the victims of war is an exemption. This organization takes responsibility to work in conflict situations.⁹⁵

HROs have a lot of experience in humanitarian aid, in terms of their organization and actual conduct of field work, but they are not able to produce the security necessary for their work in the environment of a failed state like Somalia. The reluctance of a great amount of the organizations to accept outside control or to work more closely with the military is a major obstacle for improvement to help people in a time critical situation like Somalia in late 1992. One reason for this lies in tensions between field staffs and headquarters. In the field the cooperation between HROs and the military works mostly very well. Headquarters, however, must respond to donor concerns, budget limitations and worldwide institutional consequences to a given policy.⁹⁶ HROs must give greater sensitivity to the trade off that can be created by a more intensive and more professional cooperation between the major actors in a humanitarian crises. Evaluations of the performance of HROs in developing countries, for example, regularly credit these with the ability to reach outlying communities, promoting participation, innovation and operating at low cost, but fault them for their limited replicability, lack of technical capacity and isolation from broader policy considerations.⁹⁷

IV. Conclusion

When the Somali state collapsed in the end of 1992 the UN and various HROs had already invested huge amounts of resources and manpower to stabilize the country. Operations RESTORE HOPE and UNOSOM II, between 1992 and 1995, deployed even more manpower and distributed more humanitarian aid. In the end all efforts during these

operations were a success in stopping the dying of hundred thousands of people, but failed to rescue a collapsed state. This was not due a lack of the political, military or humanitarian dimension's effort or will, rather to lack of a combined systematic approach for conflict resolution in a „New World“ after the end of the Cold War. All elements for a successful response to a post-Cold War crises in a failed state were available, but they were not used as a system.

Ludwig von Bertalanffy, in *General System Theory*, describes a „system“ in general as a set of elements in interaction which follow certain general principles, such as wholeness and sum, mechanization, hierarchic order, approach to steady states, equifinality, etc., irrespective of the nature of the system.⁹⁸ In this sense, a humanitarian intervention, to be successful beyond the short term stopping of dying, should be realized as a system of interacting political, military and humanitarian elements, which follow certain principles. Humanitarian intervention then becomes a new type of peace operation, different from peacekeeping conducted during the Cold War. The methods used and the means employed may differ from case to case, but there are some basic principles, which need to be recognized for a successful operation.

The first and most important principle is to accept that humanitarian intervention in a failed state is not a single isolated operation, which can solve a crises with a short humanitarian strike, but a process. What is needed in the case of humanitarian intervention in a failed state are not just improved operational capabilities, clearer rules of engagement, a known end state, and an exit strategy. What is needed first is a broad strategy for addressing the problems within a failed state, a strategy not only focused on the short term

success of stopping starvation and dying, but focused on the long term process of rebuilding a society with its social, political and economic elements. The perception of a humanitarian intervention as a peace operation must shift from a Cold War event- or situation-oriented view to a process-oriented one adapted to a post-Cold War environment.⁹⁹ The post-Somalia debate with its overwhelming focus on the „mission creep“ issue and the way in which the operation shifted from a humanitarian operation to peacekeeping and then to peace-enforcement is an example for this necessary shift. According to the „mission creep“ argument the distinction between Chapter VI and VII was blurred, and therein lies the reason for the ultimate failure of the operation. The real failure was to address the true cause of the failed state. Somalia was not failing because of a human crises.¹⁰⁰

Another important principle for humanitarian interventions can be described by the necessary shift from a force-oriented to a time-oriented strategy. Humanitarian intervention is not war. It is not an operation that can be based on Cold War strategy with the need for overwhelming combat power and success determined by decisive victory, but an operation which requires a combination of political, military and humanitarian means with changing weight, influence and use of these means over time. In the case of RESTORE HOPE and later UNOSOM II it was absolutely essential to use overwhelming combat power to force the fighting factions to the negotiation table. The failure was the force-oriented use of combat power as an end itself instead of a time-oriented use of force as a means to an end. A consequent combination of the available political, military and

humanitarian means over time, tied together with the support of the last resort for legacy in failed state like Somalia, the elders, might have been more successful.

The application of a dynamic combined strategy, which fuses political leadership, military engagement and humanitarian activity is a third principle. The general system theory's principles of wholeness and sum and hierarchic order, as mentioned by Ludwig von Bertalanffy, are the fundamentals of a dynamic combined strategy. To consolidate and a failed state a combination of political, military and humanitarian elements is essential. If one is missing, a humanitarian intervention can not be completed successfully.

The basic difficulty to act in a system lies in its complexity, determined by the number of more or less independent actors or organizations with interrelations on various hierarchical levels. Success in such a complex system of different organizations is not so much dependent on the efficiency within the various organizations themselves but on the interaction between them based on a common understanding of a given situation. The use of the political, military and humanitarian elements should be dynamic, shifting the main effort if appropriate from one to another over time, but never missing one of the three elements. Otherwise there will be no chance for a synergetic effect.

The principle of hierarchic order requires one of the three elements to take the lead, to provide the general vision for the problem solving process. The political element, in the post-Cold War world namely the UN, will probably be the most accepted element for taking leadership and responsibility. The challenge for its members is to create a United Nations Organization capable of managing complex operations like humanitarian interventions. The Governor of Galguduud, Somalia, Dr. Abdulkadir Mohamed Halane,

realized the need for the world's nations to send troops to Somalia in order to establish the ground for humanitarian aid when he said: „Without security there is nothing“.¹⁰¹

The three principles for a systematic approach in humanitarian interventions have their roots in the requirement of shifting the political, military and humanitarian dimension's view of peace operations towards post-Cold War challenges. A system for humanitarian intervention is possible if the key actors in such an operation adjust their criteria for action and success to meet the changes of a post-Cold War environment and find the will to follow the principles for a systematic combined effort.

Appendix A




Figure 1





Figure 2



F: Failed/Collapsed State

Figure 3




Figure 4




Figure 5




Figure 6

Appendix B

The Fighting Factions in Somalia and Disarmament

The question of, how and when to disarm the fighting factions in Somalia had several, interrelated dimensions. It was not just an operational problem in preparing troops, giving them the right mandate and the right means to perform such a mission. Next to the basic logistical needs in dealing with a huge amount of weapons and ammunition, the relationship between the fighting factions within Somalia in conjunction with their expectations of the peace forces made a decision to disarm difficult.

The following paragraphs provide an overview of the fighting factions within different regions of Somalia.

After Somalia's defeat in the 1977-1978 war with Ethiopia, and the subsequent influx of refugees, which upset the existing clan demography, there was growing political instability in Somalia. In 1978 there was a failed coup attempt. Other groups formed armed opposition movements in an attempt to depose the Government.

In the north-east, officers who had escaped arrest after the failed 1978 coup formed an opposition movement called the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). In the north-west, opponents of the Siad Barre Government formed the Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1981 and began a guerrilla war. In central Somalia, a movement drawing its main support from the Hawiye clan, the United Somali Congress (USC), also took arms against President Siad Barre's Government and in 1990 formed an alliance with the SNM and an Ogaden-based movement, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM).

In December 1990, Siad Barre declared a state of emergency. One month later, his army crumbled and he fled from Mogadishu to the south with a rump force. Huge quantities of heavy weapons fell into the hands of the victorious factions.

The USC, which took control of Mogadishu, was itself divided into rival factions based on different sub-clans of the Hawiye. One faction was headed by General Mohamed

Farah Aidid of the Habr Gedir sub-clan, who had led the USC's military operations against the Siad Barre Government and had been elected chairman of the USC at a congress held near the Ethiopia-Somalia border in 1990. General Aidid's election had not been recognized, however, by a Mogodishu-based faction of the USC, which proclaimed Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed, a member of the Abgal sub-clan, as interim president on 29 January 1991. This move was bitterly opposed by General Aidid and several other faction leaders.

Throughout 1991, Somalia was torn apart by battles among the faction's militias and by widespread looting and banditry. With no central Government, the country fragmented, as rival militias seized or fought over different regions or towns. the SSDF took power in the north-east. In central Somalia, the rival factions of the USC competed for control of Mogadishu. elsewhere, several new factions came into being, with localized power bases, as clans such had not originally possessed movements of their own moved to defend their interests. And at a conference in the town of Burao in May 1991, the SNM proclaimed an independent state in the north-west, to be known as „Somaliland“.

Despite mediation efforts sponsored by Djibouti, Egypt and Italy, and two conferences of faction leaders in Djibouti in June and July 1991, the political crisis deepened and in November 1991 an all-out war for control of Mogadishu broke out between the forces of General Aidid and those of Mr. Ali Mahdi. The fighting lasted four months, using tanks, artillery and fleets of „technicals“ - pick-up trucks mounted with large-caliber machine-guns, artillery and anti aircraft guns. Mogadishu was divided into two zones, one in the southern part of the city dominated by General Aidid's forces, the other in north Mogadishu held by Mr. Ali Mahdi's militia.

The south of the country also became a battleground. In March-April 1991, there was heavy fighting between USC forces from Mogadishu and the forces of a new movement, the Somali National Front (SNF), constituted by the remnants of ex-President Siad Barre's army. The SNF lost control of Kismayo, Somalia's second largest city, and retreated to Bardera and parts of the Gedo region which borders Kenya. In the following months, various anti-USC forces regained control of parts of the south, including Kismayo and Baidoa. They made further advances as fighting between rival USC factions engulfed Mogadishu between November 1991 and march 1992, but were eventually driven south

across the Kenyan border between April and June 1992 after a cease-fire concluded in March between the rival USC factions in Mogadishu. The cease-fire was reached following talks involving the factions, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. (Source: The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VIII, *The United Nations and Somalia*, 1992-1996, United Nations Publication, New York, NY, 1996, pp. 11)

The fighting factions could not solve their problems themselves. Unfortunately the UN's final decision to disarm after the fighting in October 1993 came to late and used the wrong means. The only realistic chance for disarmament could have been to use the traditional Somali problem solving process very early in time by integrating the traditional authorities - the elders. Time pressure, the „need“ for a quick resolution and the lack of knowledge about Somali traditions blocked this kind of development.

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- ³¹ Ibid., 1.
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- ³³ Ibid., 10, 11.
- ³⁴ Ibid., 25.
- ³⁵ The strategic equation is: Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means
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- ⁶² Ibid., 77.
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- ⁶⁴ Ibid., 42.
- ⁶⁵ Kevin C. M. Benson and Christopher B. Thrash, „Declaring Victory: Planning Exit Strategies for Peace Operations,“ Parameters (Vol. XXVI, No. 3, Autumn 1996): 79.
- ⁶⁶ The nations of the world are not willing to subordinate their military forces under direct UN control at the moment. This is the case for the U.S., the most powerful nation within the UN, but also for countries like Canada, who are not permanent members of the security council and participate very actively in peace operations as LTC P. A. Cunningham pointed out in an interview with the author.
See also: Andrew J. Goodpaster, When Diplomacy is not enough, 1.
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- ⁷⁷ Laura L. Miller and Charles Moskos, „Humanitarian or Warriors?: Race, Gender, and Combat Status in Operation Restore Hope,“ Armed Forces and Society (Vol. 21, January 1995): 626, 627.
- ⁷⁸ Andrew S. Natsios, „The International Humanitarian Response System,“ Parameters, (Vol. XXV, No.1, Spring 1995): 68.
- ⁷⁹ Non-governmental organizations are more or less private charities which may be national or international. Their level of privateness varies depending on funding. Most have a certain focus although some are multifaceted.
The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Movement is an independent humanitarian institution which transcends all political, racial and religious lines to carry out its mission of neutral intermediary in case of armed conflicts or natural disasters. It endeavors, on its own initiative, or on the basis of the Geneva Convention, to protect and assist victims of international and civil wars and of internal troubles.

The UN agencies are nearly autonomous. They are also voluntary agencies in that countries are not assessed fees for their operation, but instead contribute what they wish. They do not report to the UN General Assembly in any significant way, nor do they get policy guidance from it.

A detailed discussion about purpose, culture and organization of the humanitarian response system can be found in Andrew S. Natsios, „The International Humanitarian Response System,“ Parameters, (Vol. XXV, No.1, Spring 1995): 68-81.

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⁸¹ F.W. Russell, „The Dilemma of Humanitarian Assistance in Modern Peacekeeping,“ Peacekeeping & International Relations (Vol. 25, 03.01.1996): 2.

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